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Abstract. Traditional Byzantine resilient algorithms use 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint
paths to ensure message delivery in the presence of up to f Byzantine nodes. The
question of how these paths are identified is related to the fundamental problem
of topology discovery. Distributed algorithms for topology discovery cope with a
never ending task: dealing with frequent changes in the network topology and un-
predictable transient faults. Therefore, algorithms for topology discovery should
be self-stabilizing to ensure convergence of the topology information following
any such unpredictable sequence of events. We present the first such algorithm
that can cope with Byzantine nodes. Starting in an arbitrary global state, and in
the presence of f Byzantine nodes, each node is eventually aware of all the other
non-Byzantine nodes and their connecting communication links. Using the topol-
ogy information, nodes can, for example, route messages across the network and
deliver messages from one end user to another. We present the first deterministic,
cryptographic-assumptions-free, self-stabilizing, Byzantine-resilient algorithms
for network topology discovery and end-to-end message delivery. We also con-
sider the task of r-neighborhood discovery for the case in which r and the degree
of nodes are bounded by constants. The use of r-neighborhood discovery facil-
itates polynomial time, communication and space solutions for the above tasks.
The obtained algorithms can be used to authenticate parties, in particular during
the establishment of private secrets, thus forming public key schemes that are
resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks of the compromised Byzantine nodes. A
polynomial and efficient end-to-end algorithm that is based on the established
private secrets can be employed in between periodical secret re-establishments.
1 Introduction
Self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient topology discovery is a fundamental distributed task
that enables communication among parties in the network even if some of the compo-
nents are compromised by an adversary. Currently, such topology discovery is becom-
ing extremely important where countries’ main infrastructures, such as the electrical
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smart-grid, water supply networks and intelligent transportation systems are subject to
cyber-attacks. Self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient algorithms naturally cope with mo-
bile attacks [e.g., ? ]. Whenever the set of compromised components is fixed (or dy-
namic, but small) during a period that suffices for convergence of the algorithm, the
system starts demonstrating useful behavior following the convergence. For example,
consider the case in which nodes of the smart-grid are constantly compromised by an
adversary while local recovery techniques, such as local node reset and/or refresh, en-
sure the recovery of a compromised node after a bounded time. Once the current com-
promised set does not imply a partition of the communication graph, the distributed
control of the smart grid automatically recovers. Self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient al-
gorithms for topology discovery and message delivery are important for systems that
have to cope with unanticipated transient violations of the assumptions that the algo-
rithms are based upon, such as unanticipated violation of the upper number of com-
promised nodes and unanticipated transmission interferences that is beyond the error
correction code capabilities.
The dynamic and difficult-to-predict nature of electrical smart-grid and intelligent
transportation systems give rise to many fault-tolerance issues and require efficient so-
lutions. Such networks are subject to transient faults due to hardware/software temporal
malfunctions or short-lived violations of the assumed settings for the location and state
of their nodes. Fault-tolerant systems that are self-stabilizing [? ] can recover after the
occurrence of transient faults, which can drive the system to an arbitrary system state.
The system designers consider all configurations as possible configurations from which
the system is started. The self-stabilization design criteria liberate the system designer
from dealing with specific fault scenarios, risking neglecting some scenarios, and hav-
ing to address each fault scenario separately.
We also consider Byzantine faults that address the possibility of a node to be com-
promised by an adversary and/or to run a corrupted program, rather than merely as-
suming that they start in an arbitrary local state. Byzantine components may behave
arbitrarily (selfishly, or even maliciously) as message senders and as relaying nodes.
E.g., Byzantine nodes may block messages, selectively omit messages, redirect mes-
sage routes, playback messages, or modify messages. Any system behavior is possible,
when all (or one third or more of) the nodes are Byzantine nodes. Thus, the number of
Byzantine nodes, f , is usually restricted to be less than one third of the nodes [? ? ].
The task of r-neighborhood network discovery allows each node to know the set of
nodes that are at most r hops away from it in the communication network. Moreover,
the task provides information about the communication links attached to these nodes.
The task topology discovery considers knowledge regarding the node’s entire connected
component. The r-neighborhood network discovery and network topology discovery
tasks are identical when r is the communication graph radius.
This work presents the first deterministic self-stabilizing algorithms for r-
neighborhood discovery in the presence of Byzantine nodes. We assume that every
r-neighborhood cannot be partitioned by the Byzantine nodes. In particular, we assume
the existence of at least 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths in the r-neighborhood, between
any two non-Byzantine nodes, where at most f Byzantine nodes are present in the
r-neighborhood, rather than in the entire network. 3 Note that by the self-stabilizing
nature of our algorithms, recovery is guaranteed after a temporal violation of the above
assumption. When r is defined to be the communication graph radius, our assumptions
are equivalent to the standard assumption for Byzantine agreement in general (rather
than only complete) communication graphs. In particular the standard assumption is
that 2f + 1 vertex disjoint paths exist and are known (see e.g., [? ]) while we present
distributed algorithms to find these paths starting in an arbitrary state.
Related work. Self-stabilizing algorithms for finding vertex-disjoint paths for at
most two paths between any pair of nodes, and for all vertex-disjoint paths in anony-
mous mesh networks appear in [? ] and in [? ], respectively. We propose self-stabilizing
Byzantine resilient procedures for finding f+1 vertex-disjoint paths in 2f+1-connected
graphs. In [? ], the authors study the problem of spanning tree construction in the pres-
ence of Byzantine nodes. Nesterenko and Tixeuil [? ] presented a non-stabilizing and
inconsistent algorithm for topology discovery in the presence of Byzantine nodes –
see the paper’s errata for further details about the algorithm’s flaws. 4 Awerbuch and
Sipser [? ] consider algorithms that were designed for synchronous static network and
give topology update as an example. They show how to use such algorithms in asyn-
chronous dynamic networks. Unfortunately, their scheme starts from a consistent state
and cannot cope with transient faults or Byzantine nodes.
The problems of Byzantine gossip [? ? ? ? ? ? ] and Byzantine Broadcast [? ? ]
consider the dissemination of information in the presence of Byzantine nodes rather
than self-stabilizing topology discovery. Non-self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient gossip
in the presence of one selfish node is considered in [? ? ]. In [? ] the authors study
oblivious deterministic gossip algorithms for multi-channel radio networks with a ma-
licious adversary. They assume that the adversary can disrupt one channel per round,
preventing communication on that channel. In [? ] the authors consider probabilistic
gossip mechanisms for reducing the redundant transmissions of flooding algorithms.
They present several protocols that exploit local connectivity to adaptively correct prop-
agation failures and protect against Byzantine attacks. Probabilistic gossip mechanisms
in the context of recommendations and social networks are considered in [? ]. In [? ] the
authors consider rules for avoiding a combinatorial explosion in (non-self-stabilizing)
gossip protocol. Note that deterministic and self-stabilizing solutions are not presented
in [? ? ? ? ? ? ]. Drabkin et al. [? ] consider non-self-stabilizing broadcast protocols
that overcome Byzantine failures by using digital signatures, message signature gos-
siping, and failure detectors. Our deterministic self-stabilizing algorithm merely use
the topological properties of the communication graph to ensure correct message de-
livery to the application layer in the presence of message omission, modifications and
Byzantine nodes. A non-self-stabilizing broadcasting algorithm is considered in [? ].
The authors assume the restricted case in which links and nodes of a communication
3 Section 4 considers cases in which r and an upper bound on the node degree, ∆, are con-
stants. For these cases, we have O(n) disjoint r-neighborhoods. Each of these (disjoint) r-
neighborhoods may have up to f Byzantine nodes, and yet the above assumptions about at
least 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths in the r-neighborhood, hold.
4 http://vega.cs.kent.edu/
˜
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network are subject to Byzantine failures, and that faults are distributed randomly and
independently.
Our contribution. We present two cryptographic-assumptions-free yet secure algo-
rithms that are deterministic, self-stabilizing and Byzantine resilient.
We start by showing the existence of deterministic, self-stabilizing, Byzantine re-
silient algorithms for network topology discovery and end-to-end message delivery. The
algorithms convergence time is inO(n). They take in to account every possible path and
requiring bounded (yet exponential) memory and bounded (yet exponential) communi-
cation costs. Therefore, we also consider the task of r-neighborhood discovery, where
r is a constant. We assume that if the r-neighborhood of a node has f Byzantine nodes,
there are 2f+1 vertex independent paths between the node and any non-Byzantine node
in its r-neighborhood. The obtained r-neighborhood discovery algorithm requires poly-
nomial memory and communication costs and supports deterministic, self-stabilizing,
Byzantine-resilient algorithm for end-to-end message delivery across the network. Un-
like topology update, the proposed end-to-end message delivery algorithm establishes
message exchange synchronization between end-users that is based on message recep-
tion acknowledgments.
Detailed proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We consider settings of a standard asynchronous system [cf. ? ]. The system consists of
a set, N = {pi}, of communicating entities, chosen from a set, P , which we call nodes.
The upper bound on the number of nodes in the system is n = |P |. Each node has a
unique identifier. Sometime we refer to a set, P \ N , of nonexisting nodes that a false
indication on their existence can be recorded in the system. A node pi can directly com-
municate with its neighbors, Ni ⊆ N . The system can be represented by an undirected
network of directly communicating nodes, G = (N,E), named the communication
graph, where E = {(pi, pj) ∈ N × N : pj ∈ Ni}. We denote Nk’s set of indices by
indices(Nk) = {m : pm ∈ Nk} and Nk’s set of edges by edges(Nj) = {pj} ×Nj .
The r-neighborhood of a node pi ∈ N is the connected component that includes pi
and all nodes that can be reached from pi by a path of length r or less. The problem
of r-neighborhood topology discovery considers communication graphs in which pi’s
degree, δi, is bounded by a constant ∆. Hence, when both the neighborhood radius, r,
and the node degree, ∆, are constants the number of nodes in the r-neighborhood is
also bounded by a constant, namely by O(∆r+1).
We model the communication channel, queuei,j , from node pi to node pj ∈ Ni as a
FIFO queuing list of the messages that pi has sent to pj and pj is about to receive. When
pi sends message m, the operation send inserts a copy of m to the queue queuei,j of
the one destination pj , such that pj ∈ Ni. We assume that the number of messages in
transit, i.e., stored in queuei,j , is at most capacity. Oncem arrives, pj executes receive
and m is dequeued.
We assume that pi is completely aware of Ni, as in [? ]. In particular, we assume
that the identity of the sending node is known to the receiving one. In the context of the
studied problem, we say that node pi ∈ N is correct if it reports on its genuine neigh-
borhood, Ni. A Byzantine node, pb ∈ N , is a node that can send arbitrarily corrupted
messages. Byzantine nodes can introduce new messages and modify or omit messages
that pass through them. This way they can, e.g., disinform correct nodes about their
neighborhoods, about the neighborhood of other correct nodes, or the path through
which messages travel, to name a very few specific misleading actions that Byzantine
nodes may exhibit. Note that our assumptions do not restrict system settings in which
a duplicitous Byzantine node, pb, reports about Nb differently to its correct neighbors.
In particular, pb can have {Nb1 , . . .Nbδb } reports, such that pb’s identity in Nbi is dif-
ferent than the one in Nbj , where δx is the degree of node px. One may use a set of
non-duplicitous Byzantine nodes, {pb1 , . . . pbδ}, to model each of pb’s reports. Thus,
for a 2k + 1 connected graph, the system tolerates no more than ⌊k/∆⌋ duplicitous
Byzantine nodes, where ∆ is an upper bound on the node degree.
We denote C and B to be, respectively, the set of correct and Byzantine nodes. We
assume that |B| = f , the identity of B’s nodes is unknown to the ones in C, and B is
fixed throughout the considered execution segment. These execution segments are long
enough for convergence and then for obtaining sufficient useful work. We assume that
between any pair of correct nodes there are at least 2f + 1 vertex-disjoints paths. We
denote by Gc = (C,E ∩C ×C) the correct graph induced by the set of correct nodes.
Self-stabilizing algorithms never terminate [? ]. The non-termination property can
be easily identified in the code of a self-stabilizing algorithm: the code is usually a do
forever loop that contains communication operations with the neighbors. An iteration
is said to be complete if it starts in the loop’s first line and ends at the last (regardless of
whether it enters branches).
Every node, pi, executes a program that is a sequence of (atomic) steps. For ease of
description, we assume the interleaving model with atomic step execution; a single step
at any given time. An input event can either be the receipt of a message or a periodic
timer going off triggering pi to send. Note that the system is totally asynchronous and
the (non-fixed) node processing rates are irrelevant to the correctness proof.
The state si of a node pi consists of the value of all the variables of the node (in-
cluding the set of all incoming communication channels, {queuej,i|pj ∈ Ni}. The
execution of a step in the algorithm can change the state of a node. The term (sys-
tem) configuration is used for a tuple of the form (s1, s2, · · · , sn), where each si is
the state of node pi (including messages in transit for pi). We define an execution
E = c[0], a[0], c[1], a[1], . . . as an alternating sequence of system configurations c[x]
and steps a[x], such that each configuration c[x + 1] (except the initial configuration
c[0]) is obtained from the preceding configuration c[x] by the execution of the step a[x].
We often associate the notation of a step with its executing node pi using a subscript,
e.g., ai. An execution R (run) is fair if every correct node, pi ∈ C, executes a step
infinitely often in R. Time (e.g. needed for convergence) is measured by the number of
asynchronous rounds, where the first asynchronous round is the minimal prefix of the
execution in which every node takes at least one step. The second asynchronous round
is the first asynchronous round in the suffix of the run that follows the first asynchronous
round, and so on. The message complexity (e.g. needed for convergence) is the number
of messages measured in the specific case of synchronous execution.
We define the system’s task by a set of executions called legal executions (LE) in
which the task’s requirements hold. A configuration c is a safe configuration for an
algorithm and the task of LE provided that any execution that starts in c is a legal
execution (belongs to LE). An algorithm is self-stabilizing with relation to the task LE
when every infinite execution of the algorithm reaches a safe configuration with relation
to the algorithm and the task.
3 Topology Discovery
The algorithm learns about the neighborhoods that the nodes report. Each report mes-
sage contains an ordered list of nodes it passed so far, starting in a source node. These
lists are used for verifying that the reports are sent over f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths.
When a report message, m, arrives to pi, it inserts m to the queue
informedTopologyi, and tests the queue consistency until there is enough indepen-
dent evidence to support the report. The consistency test of pi iterates over each node
pk such that, pk appears in at least one of the messages stored in informedTopologyi.
For each such node pk, node pi checks whether there are at least f + 1 messages from
the same source node that have mutually vertex-disjoint paths and report on the same
neighborhood. The neighborhood of each such pk, that has at least f +1 vertex-disjoint
paths with identical neighborhood, is stored in the array Resulti[k] and the total num-
ber of paths that relayed this neighborhood is kept in Count[k].
We note that there may still be nodes pfake ∈ P \ (N), for which there is an
entry Result[fake]. For example, informedTopology may contain f messages, all
originated from different Byzantine nodes, and a message m′ that appears in the initial
configuration and supports the (false) neighborhood the Byzantine messages refer to.
These f + 1 messages can contain mutually vertex-disjoint paths, and thus during the
consistency test, a result will be found for Result[fake]. We show that during the next
computations, the message m′ will be identified and ignored. The Result array should
include two reports for each (undirected) edge; the two nodes that are attached to the
edge, each send a report. Hence, Result includes a set of directed (report) edges. The
term contradicting edge is needed when examining the Result set consistency.
Definition 1 (Contradicting edges). Given two nodes, pi, pj ∈ P , we say that the edge
(pi, pj) is contradicting with the set evidence ⊆ edges(Nj), if (pi, pj) 6∈ evidence.
Following the consistency test, pi examines the Result array for contradictions.
Node pi checks the path of each message m ∈ informedTopologyi with source pr,
neighborhood neighborhoodr and Pathr. If every edge (ps, pj) on the path appears
in Result[s] and Result[j], then we move to the next message. Otherwise, we found a
fake supporter, and therefore we reduce Count[r] by one. If the resulting Count[r] is
smaller than f +1, we nullify the r’th entry of the Result array. Once all messages are
processed, the Result array consisting of the (confirmed) local topologies is the output.
At the end, pi forwards the arriving message, m, to each neighbor that does not appear
in the path of m. The message sent by pi includes the node from which m arrived as
part of the path m.
The pseudocode of Algorithm 1 In every iteration of the infinite loop, pi starts to
compute its preliminary topology view by calling ComputeResults in line 2. Then,
every node pk in the queue InformedTopology, node pi goes over the messages in
the queue from head to bottom. While iterating the queue, for every message m with
source pk, neighborhoodNk and visited path Pathk, pi inserts Pathk to opinion[Nk],
see line 18. After inserting, pi checks if there is a neighborhood Neigk for which
opinion[Neigk] contains at least f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths, see line 19. When such
a neighborhood is found, it is stored in the Result array (line 19). In line 20, pi
stores the number of vertex disjoint paths relayed messages that contained the se-
lected neighborhood for pk. After computing an initial view of the topology, in line 3,
pi removes non-existing nodes from the computed topology. For every message m in
InformedTopology, node pi aims at validating its visited path. In line 24, pi checks
if there exists a node pk whose neighborhood contradicts the visited path of m. If such
a node exists, pi decreases the associated entry in the Count array (line 25). This de-
crease may cause Count[r] to be smaller than f + 1, in this case pi considers pk to be
fake and deletes the local topology of pk from Result[r] (line 26).
• Insert(m): Insert item m to the queue head.
• Remove(Messagem): Remove item m from the queue.
• Iterator(): Returns an pointer for iterating over the queue’s
items by their residence order in the queue.
•HasNext(): Tests whether the Iterator is at the queue end.
•Next() Returns the next element to iterate over.
• SizeOf() Returns the number of elements in the calling set.
•MoveToHead(m): Move item m to the queue head.
• IsAfter(m, S): Test that item m is after the items m′ ∈
S, where S is the queue item set.
Fig. 1. Queue: general purpose data structure for
queuing items, and its operation list.
Upon receiving a message m,
node pi inserts the message to the
queue, in case it does not already ex-
ist, and just moves it to the top of
the queue in case it does. The node
pi now needs to relay the message
pi got to all neighbors that are not
on the message visited path (line 9).
When sending, pi also attaches the
identifier of the node, from which the
message was received, to the visited
path of the message.
Algorithm’s correctness proof. We now prove that within a linear amount of asyn-
chronous rounds, the system stabilizes and every output is legal. The proof considers an
arbitrary starting configuration with arbitrary messages in transit that could be actually
in the communication channel or already stored in pj’s message queue and will be for-
warded in the next steps of pj . Each message in transit that traverse correct nodes can
be forwarded within less than O(|C|) asynchronous rounds. Note that any message that
traverses Byzantine nodes and arrives to a correct node that has at least one Byzantine
node in its path. The reason is that the correct neighbor to the last Byzantine in the path
lists the Byzantine node when forwarding the message. Thus, f is at most the number
of messages that encode vertex-disjoint paths from a certain source that are initiated or
corrupted by a Byzantine node. Since there are at least f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths with
no Byzantine nodes from any source pk to any node pi and since pk repeatedly sends
messages to all nodes on all possible paths, pi receives at least f +1 messages from pk
with vertex-disjoint paths.
The FIFO queue usage and the repeated send operations of pk ensure that the most
recent f + 1 messages with vertex-disjoint paths in InformedTopology queue are
uncorrupted messages. Namely, misleading messages that were present in the initial
configuration will be pushed to appear below the new f + 1 uncorrupted messages.
Thus, each node pi eventually has the local topology of each correct node (stored in
Algorithm 1: Topology discovery (code for node pi)
Input: Neighborhoodi: The ids of the nodes with which node pi can communicate directly;
Output: ConfirmedTopology ⊂ P × P : Discovered topology, which is represent by a directed edge set;
Variable InformedTopology : Queue, see Figure 1: topological messages,
〈node, neighborhood, path〉;
Function: NodeDisjointPaths(S): Test S = {〈node, neighborhood, path〉} to encode at least f + 1
vertex-disjoint paths;
Function: PathContradictsNeighborhood(k,Neighborhoodk, path): Test that there is no node
pj ∈ N for which there is an edge (pk, pj) in the message’s visited path, path ⊆ P ×N , such that
(pk, pj) is contradicting with Neighborhoodk;
1 while true do
2 Result ← ComputeResults()
3 let Result ← RemoveContradictions(Result)
4 RemoveGarbage(Result)
5 ConfirmedTopology ← ConfirmedTopology ∪ (
⋃
pk∈P
Result[k])
6 foreach pk ∈ Ni do send(i, Neighborhoodi, ∅) to pk
7 Upon Receive (〈ℓ, Neighborhoodℓ, V isitedPathℓ〉) from pj ;
begin
8 Insert(pℓ, Neighborhoodℓ, V isitedPathℓ ∪ {j})
9 foreach pk ∈ Ni do if k 6∈ V isitedPathℓ then send(pℓ, Neighborhoodℓ, V isitedPathℓ ∪ {j})
to pk
10 Procedure: Insert(k, Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathk);
begin
11 if 〈k, Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathk〉 ∈ InformedTopology then
InformedTopology.MoveToHead(m)
12 else if pk ∈ N ∧Neighborhoodk ⊆ indices(N) ∧ V isitedPathk ⊆ indices(N) then
InformedTopology.Insert(〈k, Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathk〉)
13 Function: ComputeResults();
begin
14 foreach pk ∈ P : 〈k, Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathk〉 ∈ InformedTopology do
15 let (FirstDisjointPathsFound, Message, opinion[]) ←
(false, InformedTopology.Iterator(), [∅])
16 while Message.hasNext() do
17 〈ℓ,Neighborhoodℓ, V isitedPathℓ〉 ←Message.Next()
18 if ℓ = k then opinion[Neighborhoodℓ].Insert(〈 ℓ, Neighborhoodℓ,
V isitedPathℓ〉)
19 if FirstDisjointPathsFound = false ∧
NodeDisjointPaths(opinion[Neighborhoodℓ ]) then
(Result[k], F irstDisjointPathsFound) ← (Neighborhoodℓ, true)
20 Count[k] ← opinion[k][Result[k.SizeOf()
21 return Result
22 Function: RemoveContradictions(Result);
begin
23 foreach 〈r,Neighborhoodr, V isitedPathr〉 ∈ InformedTopology do
24 if ∃pk ∈ P : PathContradictsNeighborhood(pk, Result[k], V isitedPathr) = true
then
25 if Neighborhoodr = Result[r] then Count[r] ← Count[r]− 1
26 if Count[r] ≤ f then Result[r] ← ∅
27 return Result
28 Procedure: RemoveGarbage(Result);
begin
29 foreach pk ∈ N do
30 foreach m = 〈k, Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathk〉 ∈ InformedTopology :
{k} ∪Neighborhoodk ∪ V isitedPathk 6⊆ P ∨ InformedTopology.IsAfter(m,
opinion[k][Result[k]]) do InformedTopology.Remove(m)
the Resulti array). The opposite is however not correct as local topologies of non-
existing nodes may still appear in the result array. For example, InformedTopologyi
may include in the first configuration f + 1 messages with vertex-disjoint paths for a
non-existing node. Since after ComputeResults we know the correct neighborhood
of each correct node pk, we may try to ensure the validity of all messages. For every
message that encodes a non-existing source node, there must be a node pℓ on the mes-
sage path, such that pℓ is correct and pℓ’s neighbor is non-existing, this is true since pi
itself is correct. Thus, we may identify these messages and ignore them. Furthermore,
no valid messages are ignored because of this validity check.
We also note that, since we assume that the nodes of the system are a subset of P ,
the size of the queue InformedTopology is bounded. Lemma 1 bounds the needed
amount of node memory (the proof details appear in Section A of the Appendix).
Lemma 1 (Bounded memory). At any time, there are at most n · 22n messages in
InformedTopologyi, where pi ∈ C, n = |P | and O(n log(n)) is the message size.
r-neighborhood discovery. Algorithm 1 demonstrates the existence of a deterministic
self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient algorithm for topology discovery. Lemma 1 shows
that the memory costs are high when the entire system topology is to be discovered.
We note that one may consider the task of r-neighborhood discovery. Recall that in
the r-neighborhood discovery task, it is assumed that every r-neighborhood cannot be
partitioned by Byzantine nodes. Therefore, it is sufficient to constrain the maximal path
length in line 9. The correctness proof of the algorithm for the r-neighborhood discov-
ery follows similar arguments to the correctness proof of Algorithm 1.
4 End-to-End Delivery
We present a design for a self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient algorithm for the transport
layer protocol that uses the output of Algorithm 1. The design is based on a function
(named getDisjointPaths()) for selecting vertex-disjoint paths that contain a set of
f +1 correct vertex-disjoint paths. We use getDisjointPaths() and ARQ (Automatic
Repeat reQuest) techniques for designing Algorithm 2, which ensures safe delivery
between sender and receiver.
Exchanging messages over f+1 correct vertex-disjoint paths We guarantee correct
message exchange by sending messages over a polynomial number of vertex-disjoint
paths between the sender and the receiver. We consider a set, CorrectPaths, that in-
cludes f +1 correct vertex-disjoint paths. Suppose that ConfirmedTopology (see the
output of Algorithm 1) encodes a set, Paths, of 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths between
the sender and the receiver. It can be shown that Paths includes at most f incorrect
paths that each contain at least one Byzantine node, i.e., Paths ⊇ CorrectPaths. As
we see next, ConfirmedTopology does not always encode Paths, thus, one needs to
circumvent this difficultly.
Note that even though 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths between the sender and
the receiver are present in the communication graph, the discovered topology in
ConfirmedTopology may not encode the set Paths, because f of the paths in the set
Paths can be controlled by Byzantine nodes. Namely, the information about at least
one edge in f of the paths in the set Paths, can be missing in ConfirmedTopology.
We consider the problem of relaying messages over the set CorrectPaths when
only ConfirmedTopology is known, and propose three implementations to the func-
The case of constant r and∆. The sender and the receiver exchange messages by using all
possible paths between them; feasible considering r-neighborhoods, where the neighborhood
radius, r, and the node degree ∆ are constants.
The case of constant f . For each possible choice of f system nodes, p1, p2, . . . pf ,
the sender and the reciter compute a new graph G(p1, p2, . . . pf ) that is the result of re-
moving p1, p2, . . . pf , from Gout, which is the graph defined by the discovered topology,
ConfirmedTopology. Let P(p1, p2, . . . pf ) be a set of f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths in
G(p1, p2, . . . pf ) (or the empty set when P(p1, p2, . . . pf ) does not exists) and Paths =⋃
p1,p2,...pf
P(p1, p2, . . . pf ). The sender and the receiver can exchange messages over
Paths, because |Paths| is polynomial at least one choice of p1, p2, . . . pf , has a corre-
sponding set P(p1, p2, . . . pf ) that contains CorrectPaths (Section B of the Appendix).
The case of no Byzantine neighbors The procedure assumes that any Byzantine node
has no directly connected Byzantine neighbor in the communication graph. Specifically, this
polynomial cost solution considers the (extended) graph, Gext, that includes all the edges in
confirmedTopology and suspicious edges. Given three nodes, pi, pj , pk ∈ P , we say that
node pi considers the undirected edge (pk, pj) suspicious, if the edge appears as a directed
edge in ConfirmedTopologyi for only one direction, e.g., (pj , pk).
The extended graph, Gext, may contain fake edges that do not exists in the communication
graph, but Byzantine nodes reports on their existence. Nevertheless, Gext includes all the
correct paths of the communication graph, G. Therefore, the 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths
that exists in G also exists in Gext and they can facilitate a polynomial cost solution for the
message exchange task (Section B of the Appendix).
Fig. 2. Implementation proposals for the function getDisjointPaths().
tion getDisjointPaths() in Figure 2. The value of ConfirmedTopology is a set of
directed edges (pi, pj). An undirected edge is approved if both (pi, pj) and (pj , pi)
appear in ConfirmedTopology. Other edges in ConfirmedTopology are said to
be suspicious. For each of the proposed implementations, we show in Section B
of the Appendix that a polynomial number of paths are used and that they contain
CorrectPaths. Thus, the sender and the receiver can exchange messages using a poly-
nomial number of paths and message send operations, because each path is of linear
length.
Ensuring safe message delivery We propose a way for the sender and the receiver,
that exchange a message over the paths in getDisjointPaths(), to stop considering
messages and acknowledgments sent by Byzantine nodes. They repeatedly send mes-
sages and acknowledgments over the selected vertex-disjoint paths. Before message
or acknowledgment delivery, the sender and the receiver expect to receive each mes-
sage and acknowledgment at least (capacity · n + 1) consecutive times over at least
f + 1 vertex independent paths, and by that provide evidence that their messages and
acknowledgments were indeed sent by them.
We employ techniques for labeling the messages (in an ARQ style), recording vis-
ited path of each message, and counting the number of received message over each
path. The sender sends messages to the receiver, and the receiver responds with ac-
knowledgments after these messages are delivered to the application layer. Once the
sender receives the acknowledgment, it can fetch the next message that should be sent
to the receiver. The difficulty here is to guarantee that the sender and receiver can in-
deed exchange messages and acknowledgments between them, and stop considering
messages and acknowledgments sent by Byzantine nodes.
The sender repeatedly sends message m, which is identified by m.ARQLabel, to
the receiver over all selected paths. The sender does not stop sending m before it is
guaranteed thatmwas delivered to the application layer of the receiving-side. When the
receiver receives the message, the set m.V isitedPath encodes the path along which m
was relayed over. Before delivery, the receiver expects to receive m at least (capacity ·
n + 1) consecutive times from at least f + 1 vertex independent paths. Waiting for
(capacity · n + 1) consecutive messages on each path, ensures that the receiver gets
at least one message which was actually sent recently by the sender. Once the receiver
delivers m to the application layer, the receiver starts to repeatedly acknowledge with
the label m.ARQLabel over the selected paths (while recording the visited path). The
sender expects to receivem’s acknowledgment at least capacity·n+1 consecutive times
from at least f +1 vertex independent paths before concluding that m was delivered to
the application layer of the receiving-side.
Once the receiver delivers a message to the application layer, the receiver starts to
repeatedly acknowledge the recently delivered message over the selected paths. In ad-
dition, the receiver also restarts its counters and the log of received messages upon a
message delivery to the application layer. Similarly the sender count acknowledgments
to the current label used, when the sender receives at least capacity · n + 1 acknowl-
edgments over f +1 vertex-disjoint paths, the sender fetches the next message from the
application layer, changes the label and starts to send the new message.
The pseudocode of Algorithm 2 In every iteration of the infinite loop, pi fetches
Message, prepares Message’s label (line 3) and starts sending Message over the
selected paths, see the procedure ByzantineFaultT olerantSend(Message). When
pi gets enough acknowledgments for Message (line 4), pi stops sending the current
message and fetches the next. Upon receiving a message msg, node pi tests msg’s des-
tination (line 6). When pi is not msg’s destination, it forwards msg to the next node on
msg’s intended path, after updating msg’s visited path. When pi is msg’s destination,
pi checks msg’s type (line 9). When msg’s type is Data, pi inserts the message pay-
load and label to the part of the data structure associated with the message source, i.e.,
the sender, and the message visited path (line 10). In line 12, node pi checks whether
f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths relayed the message at least capacity · n + 1 times, where
capacity is an upper bound on the number of messages in transit over a communication
link. If so, pi delivers the msg to the application layer (line 20), clears the entire data
structure and finally sends acknowledgments on the selected paths until a new message
is confirmed. Moreover, in line 21 we signal that we are ready to receive a new mes-
sage. When msg’s type is ACK , we act almost as when the message is of type Data.
When the condition in line 18 holds, we signal that the message was confirmed at the
receiver by setting Approved to be true, in line 18. We note that the code of Algo-
rithm 2 considers only one possible pair of source and destination. A many-source to
many-destination version of this algorithm can simply use a separate instantiation of
this algorithm for each pair of source and destination.
Algorithm 2: Self-stabilizing Byzantine resilient end-to-end delivery (pi’s code)
Interface: FetchMessage(): Gets messages from the upper layer. We denote by InputMessageQueue the
unbounded queue of all messages that are to be delivered to the destination;
Interface: DeliverMessage(Source, Message): Deliver an arriving message to the higher layer. We
denote by OutputMessageQueue the unbounded queue of all messages that are to be delivered to
the higher layer. We assume that it always contains at least the last message inserted to it;
Input: ConfirmedTopology: The discovered topology (represented by a directed edge set, see Algorithm 1);
Data Structure: Transport layer messages: 〈Source, Destination, V isitedPath, IntentedPath,
ARQLabel, Type, Payload〉, where Source is the sending node, Destination is the
target node, V isitedPath is the actual relay path, IntentedPath is the planned relay path,
ARQLabel is the sequence number of the stop-and-wait ARQ protocol, and Type ∈ {Data,
ACK} message type, where DATA and ACK are constant;
Variable Message: the current message being sent;
Variable ReceivedMessages[j][Path] : queue of pj ’s messages that were relayed over path Path;
Variable Confirmations[j][Path] : pj ’s acknowledgment queue for messages that were relayed over Path;
Variable label: the current sequence number of the stop-and-wait ARQ protocol;
Variable Approved: A Boolean variable indicating whether Message was accepted at the destination;
Function: NodeDisjointPaths(S): Test S, a set of paths, to encode at least f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths;
Function: FloodedPath(MessageQueue, m) : Test whether m is encoded by the first capacity · n+ 1
messages in MessageQueue.;
Function: getDisjointPaths(ReportedTopology, Source,Destination) : Get a set of vertex-disjoint
paths between Source and Destination in the discovered graph, ReportedTopology (Figure 2).;
Function: ClearQueue(Source) : Delete all data in ReceivedMessages[Source][∗];
Function: ClearAckQueue(Destination) : Delete all data in Confirmations[Destination][∗];
1 while true do
2 ClearAckQueue(Message.Destination)
3 (Message, label) ← (FetchMessage(), label + 1modulo 3)
4 while Approved = false do ByzantineFaultTolerantSend(Message)
5 Upon Receive (msg) From pj ;
begin
6 if msg.Destination 6= i then
7 msg.V isitedPath ← msg.V isitedPath ∪ {j}
8 send(msg) to next (msg.IntendedPath)
9 else if msg.Type = Data then
10 ReceivedMessages[msg.Source][msg.V isitedPath].insert(〈msg.Payload,
msg.ARQLabel 〉)
11 let Paths← {Path : FloodedPath(Confirmations[msg.Source][Path], msg)}
12 if NodeDisjointPaths(Paths) then
13 NewMesssage ← true
14 Confirm(msg.Source,m.ARQLabel,m.Payload)
15 else if msg.Type = ACK then
16 if label = msg.ARQLabel then
Confirmations[msg.Source][msg.V isitedPath].insert(〈msg.Payload, msg.ARQLabel〉)
17 let Paths← {Path : FloodedPath(Confirmations[msg.Source][Path],
〈msg.Payload, msg.ARQLabel 〉)}
18 if NodeDisjointPaths(Paths) then Approved← true
19 Function: Confirm(Source,ARQLabel, Payload);
begin
20 if CurrentLabel 6= ARQLabel then DeliverMessage(Source, Payload)
21 (CurrentLabel, NewMessage) ← (ARQLabel, false)
22 ClearQueue(Source)
23 while NewMessage = false do ByzantineFaultTolerantSend(〈 Source, ARQLabel,
ACK, Payload〉)
24 Function: ByzantineFaultTolerantSend(〈Destination, ARQLabel, Type, Payload〉);
begin
25 let Paths← getDisjointPaths(ConfirmedTopology, i, Destination)
26 foreach Path ∈ Paths do send(〈i,Destination, ∅, Path,ARQLabel, Type, Payload〉) to
first(Path)
Correctness proof. We show that message delivery guarantees hold after a bounded
convergence period. The proof is based on the system’s ability to relay messages over
f + 1 correct vertex-disjoint messages (Figure 2), and focuses on showing safe mes-
sage delivery between the sender and the receiver. After proving that the sender fetches
messages infinitely often, we show that within four such fetches, the message delivery
guarantees hold; receiver-side delivers all of the sender’s messages and just them. The
proof in detail appears in Section C of the Appendix.
Let us consider messages, m, and their acknowledgements, that arrive at least
(capacity · n + 1) times over f + 1 vertex-independent paths, to the receiver-side,
and respectively the sender-side, with identical payloads and labels. The receiver, and
respectively the sender, has the evidence that m was indeed sent by the sender, and re-
spectively, acknowledged by the receiver. The sender and the receiver clear their logs
whenever they have such evidences aboutm. The proof shows that, after a finite conver-
gence period, the system reaches an execution in which the following events reoccur:
(Fetch) the sender clears its log, fetches message m, and sends it to the receiver, (R-
Get) the receiver gets the evidence that m was indeed sent by the sender, (Deliver) the
receiver clears its log, delivers m, and acknowledge it to the sender, and (S-Get) the
sender gets the evidence that m was acknowledged by the receiver. Namely, the system
reaches a legal execution.
First we prove that event Fetch occurs infinitely often, in the way of proof by con-
tradiction. Let us assume (towards a contradiction) that the sender fetches message m
and then never fetches another message m′. The sender sends m and counts acknowl-
edgments that has m’s label. According to the algorithm, the sender can fetch the next
message, m′ 6= m, when it has the evidence that m was indeed acknowledged by the
receiver. The receiver acknowledgesm’s reception when it has the evidence that m was
indeed sent by the sender. After nullifying its logs, the receiver repeatedly sends m’s
acknowledgments until it has evidences for other messages, m′, that were indeed sent
by the sender after m. By the assumption that the sender never fetches m′ 6= m, we
have that the receiver keeps on acknowledgingm untilm′ 6= m arrives from the sender.
Therefore, m arrives from the sender to the receiver, and the receiver acknowledges m
to the sender. Thus, a contradiction that the sender never fetches m′ 6= m.
The rest of the proof shows that (eventually) between every two event of type Fetch,
also the events R-Get, Deliver and S-Get occur (and in that order). We show that this
is guaranteed within four occurrences of event Fetch. Following the fetch of each of
the first three messages and before the next one, the sender must have evidence that
the receiver executed event Deliver, i.e., clearing the receiver’s log. Note that during
convergence, this may surely be false evidence. Just before fetching a new message in
event Fetch, the sender must clear its logs and reassign a label value, say, the value is
0. There must be a subsequent fetch with label 1, because, as explained above, event
Fetch occurs (infinitely often). Since the sender clears its logs in event Fetch, from
now on and until the next event Fetch, any corrupted message found in the sender’s log
must be of Byzantine origin. Therefore, the next time sender gets the evidence that m
was acknowledged by the receiver, the receiver has truly done so. Note that between any
such two (truthful) acknowledgments (with different labels), say with label, 1, 2, . . ., the
receiver must execute event Deliver and clean its log, see Algorithm 2, line 22. Since
the sender sends over f+1 correct paths, and the receiver’s logs are clear, eventually the
receiver will have evidence for the message with label 0. As corrupted messages origi-
nate only from Byzantine nodes and there are at most f such nodes, the receiver’s log
may not contain evidence for non-sender messages. To conclude, starting from the 4-th
message, the receiver will confirm all of the sender’s messages, and will not confirm
non-sender messages.
5 Extensions and Conclusions
As an extension to this work, we suggest to combine the algorithms for r-neighborhood
network discovery and the end-to-end capabilities in order to allow the use of end-
to-end message delivery within the r-neighborhoods. These two algorithms can be
used by the nodes, under reasonable node density assumptions, for discovering their r-
neighborhoods, and, subsequently, extending the scope of their end-to-end capabilities
beyond their r-neighborhood, as we describe in the following. We instruct further re-
mote nodes to relay topology information, and in this way collect information on remote
neighborhoods. One can consider an algorithm for studying specific remote neighbor-
hoods that are defined, for example, by their geographic region, assuming the usage of
GPS inputs; a specific direction and distance from the topology exploring node defines
the exploration goal. The algorithm nominates 2f + 1 nodes in the specific direction
to return further information towards the desired direction. The sender uses end-to-end
communication to the current 2f + 1 nodes in the front of the current exploration, asks
them for their r-neighborhood, and chooses a new set of 2f + 1 nodes for forming a
new front. It then instructs each of the current nodes in the current front to communicate
with each node in the chosen new front, to nominate the new front nodes to form the
exploration front.
To ensure stabilization, this interactive process of remote information collection
should never stop. Whenever the current collection process investigates beyond the
closest r-neighborhood, we concurrently start a new collection process in a pipeline
fashion. The output is the result of the last finalized collection process. Thus, having a
correct output after the first time a complete topology investigation is finalized.
In this work we presented two deterministic, self-stabilizing Byzantine-resilience al-
gorithms for topology discovery and end-to-end message delivery. We have also consid-
ered an algorithm for discovering r-neighborhood in polynomial time, communication
and space. Lastly, we mentioned a possible extension for exploring and communicating
with remote r-neighborhoods using polynomial resources as well.
The obtained end-to-end capabilities can be used for communicating the public keys
of parties and establish private keys, in spite of f corrupted nodes that may try to con-
duct man-in-the-middle attacks, an attack that the classical Public key infrastructure
(PKI) does not cope with. Once private keys are established encrypted messages can
be forwarded over any specific f + 1 node independent paths, one of which must be
Byzantine free. The Byzantine free path will forward the encrypted message to the
receiver while all corrupted messages will be discarded. Since our system should be
self-stabilizing, the common private secret should be re-established periodically.
A Correctness of Algorithm 1
Lemma 1 (Bounded memory) Let pi ∈ C be a correct node. At any time, there
are at most n · 22n messages in InformedTopologyanyi, where n = |P | and
O(|P | log(|P |)) is the message size.
Proof. The queue InformedTopologyanyi, is made up of messages in the form
〈node, neighborhood, visitedpath〉. All nodes that appear in the message, i.e., in the
first, second or third entry of the tuple are in N . The first entry, i.e. the node name
is one of n possibilities. The second and third entries are subsets of N . Thus each of
them has 2n possibilities. In total there can be at most 2n · 2n · n messages in every
InformedTopologyanyi.
Definition 2 specifies the requirements of the network topology discovery task. Def-
inition 3 considers correct paths and Definition 4 considers uncorrupted graph topology
messages.
Definition 2 (Legal output). Given correct node pi ∈ C, we say that pi’s output is
legal, if it encodes graph Goutput = (Vout, Eout): (1) C ⊆ Vout ⊆ C ∪ B ⊆ N , and
(2) (E ∩ (C × C)) ⊆ Eout ⊆ E ⊆ N ×N .
Definition 3 (Correct path). We say path ⊆ N is a correct one if all its nodes are
correct, i.e., path ⊆ C.
Definition 4 (Valid message). In Algorithm 1, we refer to a message m =
〈k,Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathk〉 as a valid message when: (1) pk ∈ C and
V isitedPathk encodes a correct path in the communication graph, G, that starts in
pk, and (2) Neighborhoodk = indices(Nk).
Lemma 2 shows that eventually correct paths do not relay non valid messages.
Namely, invalid messages can only exist as the result of: (1) Byzantine interventions
that corrupt messages, or (2) transient faults, which occur only prior to the arbitrary
starting configuration considered. 5
We note that we consider asymptotic behavior in the following lemma and thus,
capacity is omitted from the number of asynchronous round until stabilization.
Lemma 2 (Eventually valid messages). Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 1 that
starts in an arbitrary configuration. Within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds, the system
reaches a configuration after which only valid messages are relayed on correct paths.
5 This is a common way to argue about self-stabilization, we consider executions that start in an
arbitrary configuration that follows the last transient fault, recalling that if additional transient
faults occur a new arbitrary configuration is reached from which automatic convergence starts.
Proof. Let c ∈ R be the starting configuration. Suppose that c includes an invalid
message, m = 〈ℓ,Neighborhoodℓ, V isitedPathℓ〉, in transit between correct nodes.
The lemma is obviously correct for the case thatm is relayed by Byzantine nodes during
the first O(|N |) asynchronous rounds of R. Therefore, we consider only the correct
paths, path, over which m is relayed during the first O(|N |) asynchronous rounds of
R. We show that, within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds, no correct node in path relays
m.
Let pj, pi ∈ path be correct neighbors on the correct path. Suppose that in c, mes-
sage m is in transit from pj to pi. Upon the arrival of message m to pi (line 7), pi sends
mi = 〈ℓ,Neighborhoodℓ, V isitedPathℓ ∪ {j}〉 to any neighbor pk ∈ path on the
path for which pk ∈ Ni ∧ k 6∈ V isitedPathℓ, see line 9.
Node pi adds pj’s identifier to m’s visited path V isitedPathℓ, see line 9. The same
argument holds for any correct neighbors, p′j , p′j ∈ path when pj sends message m′j to
the next node in path, node p′i. Therefore, within |path\V isitedPathℓ| asynchronous
rounds, it holds that N ′i ∩ (path \ V isitedPathℓ) = {p′j, p′i}.
Note that p′i makes sure that V isitedPath′ℓ does not encode loops, i.e., pk 6∈
V isitedPath′ℓ, see line 9. Therefore, node p′i does not relay message m′ to pk.
Definition 5 considers queues that their recent valid messages encode at least f + 1
vertex-disjoint paths. Moreover, the invalid ones encode at most f such paths.
Definition 5 (Valid queue). Let pi, pk ∈ C be two correct nodes. We say that pi’s
queue, InformedTopologyi, is valid (with respect to pk) whenever there is a pre-
fix, V alidInformationi,k, of messages mk in the queue InformedTopologyi, such
that: (1) there is a subset, V alid = {mℓ = 〈k,Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathℓ〉 :
mℓ is valid} ⊆ V alidInformationi,k, for which the set {V isitedPathℓ} en-
codes at least f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths, and (2) the set, Invalid = {mℓ =
〈k,Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathℓ〉 : mℓ is invalid} ⊆ V alidInformationi,k, for
which the set {V isitedPathℓ} encodes at most f vertex-disjoint paths.
Claim A shows that, within O(|C|) asynchronous rounds, correct paths propagate
valid messages.
Claim. Let path ⊆ C be a correct path from pi to pk. Suppose that mi = 〈i, Ni, ∅〉
is a (valid) message that pi sends, see line 6. Within O(|path|) asynchronous rounds,
message mi is relayed on path, and arrives at pk as m′i = 〈i, Ni, path〉. Namely, path
is m′i’s visited path.
Proof. Let c ∈ R be the first configuration that follows the start of mi’s propagation
in path. I.e., c is the configuration that immediately follows the step in which node pi
sends mi by executing line 6. Let pr, pj ∈ path be two correct neighbors on the path.
Without the loss of generality, suppose that node pi sends message mi directly to node
pr, i.e., in c, node pr is just about to receive mi. The proof arguments hold also when
assuming that pj sends message mj = 〈i, Ni, {r}〉 to the next node in path. Thus,
generality is not lost.
We show that, within one asynchronous round, pr sends mr to pj . Upon the arrival
of messagemi to pr (line 7), node pr sends the messagemr to any neighbor, such as pj ,
for which pj ∈ Nr∧r 6∈ V isitedPathi = ∅, see line 9. Since the same argument holds
when pj sends mj to the next node in path, we have that within |path| asynchronous
rounds, m′i is delivered to node pk.

Lemma 3 shows that queues get to become valid.
Lemma 3 (Eventually valid queues). Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 1 that
starts in an arbitrary configuration and pi, pk ∈ C be any pair of correct nodes. The
system reaches a configuration in which the queue, InformedTopologyi, is valid (with
respect to pk), within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds.
Proof. Let c ∈ R be a configuration achieved in Lemma 2 withinO(|N |) asynchronous
rounds. We show that within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds after c, the system reaches a
configuration in which InformedTopologyi, is valid (with respect to pk), see Defini-
tion 5.
In configuration c, all messages in transit on correct paths are valid, see Lemma 2.
Thus, the only messages entering InformedTopologyi are either valid or have passed
through Byzantine nodes. Denote mbarrier to be the top message the queue (i.e., the
last message entered into the queue) InformedTopologyi in configuration c. More-
over, V alidInformationi,k includes all the messages in InformedTopologyi, that
are between the queue’s head and mbarrier.
We show that condition (1) of Definition 5 holds. There are 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint
paths between pi and pk. At most f nodes are Byzantine and thus, there are at least
f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths between pi and pk that are correct. By Claim A within
O(|C|) asynchronous rounds, a valid message, mk, is received on all f + 1 (correct)
vertex-disjoint paths. Message mk is inserted to InformedTopologyi after config-
uration c. Therefore, mk is in front of mbarrier. Hence, the set V alid = {mℓ =
〈ℓ,Neighborhoodℓ, V isitedPathℓ〉 : mℓ is valid} ⊆ V alidInformationi,k contains
at least f +1 valid messages whose respective visited paths, V isitedPathℓ, are vertex-
disjoint.
We show that condition (2) of Definition 5 holds. Any invalid messages, mk, that
is sent after configuration c, must go through a Byzantine node, see Lemma 2.
Claim. Suppose that message m is relayed through a Byzantine node after configura-
tion c, then in any following configuration, whilem is still in transit, there is a Byzantine
node in the visitedPath.
Proof. Observe the first correct node pk after the last Byzantine node b on m’s path. pk
is correct, thus it inserts b to the visited path. b is the last on the path and so the visited
path must contain it until end of transit or passing through a different Byzantine. 
Each such Byzantine node is recorded in the message path, see Claim A. Since
there are at most f Byzantine nodes, there could be at most f such messages with
vertex-disjoint paths. This completes the proof condition (2) and the lemma.
Lemma 6 shows that correct information gets confirmed, and requires Definition 6.
Definition 6 (Message confirmation). We say that message mi =
〈k,Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathki〉 is confirmed (by node pi) when
Neighborhoodk ⊆ ConfirmedTopologyi.
Lemma 4 (Eventually confirmed messages). Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 1
that starts in an arbitrary configuration and pi, pk ∈ C be any pair of correct nodes.
Within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds, the system reaches a configuration after which the
fact that message mi = 〈k,Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathki〉 is confirmed, implies
that Neighborhoodk = indices(Nℓ).
Proof. Let c ∈ R be the first configuration in which InformedTopologyi is a valid
queue and node pi completes a full iteration of the do forever loop that starts in line 1.
By Lemma 3, the system reaches c within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds.
We know that in configuration c, the array Resulti satisfies that Resulti[k] =
indices(Nℓ). We go through the computation of Result in lines 2 to 4.
• ComputeResults(), line 2. Let Resi[k] = indices(N ′ℓ) be
ComputeResults()’s return value with respect to node pk. We show that Resi[k] =
indices(Nℓ). Moreover, we show that the neighborhood that will be found will be
that which is represented in V alid = {mℓ = 〈k,Neighborhoodk, V isitedPathℓ〉 :
mℓ is valid} ⊆ V alidInformationi,k.
We recall that the set {V isitedPathℓ} encodes at least f +1 disjoint paths. Also in
the prefix V alidInformationi,k one can not find f + 1 invalid messages with vertex-
disjoint messages; See Definition 5.
The function must choose the message containing the neighborhood
Neighborhoodk. Otherwise, we have chosen a different neighborhood for k, say
Neighborhood′k 6= Neighborhoodk = indices(Nk). That is, at the time of checking
line 19 with neighborhood Neighborhoodℓ = Neighborhood′k, there were at least
f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths in opinion[Neighborhoodℓ]. This is in contradiction to
condition (2) of Definition 5. Moreover in line 20, it holds Count[k] > f + 1, since at
least all the correct paths were counted.
• RemoveContradictions(), line 3. Let Resi = ComputeResults()
and ResRemoveContradictionsi = RemoveContradictions(Resi) (line 3).
We show that ResRemoveContradictionsi[r] = indices(Nr). The function
RemoveContradictions() modifies Resi[r] only in line 26 by nullifying it when-
ever Count[r] ≤ f . We demonstrate that, for any correct path V isitedPathk, there
exists no pℓ for which PathContradictsNeighborhood(pℓ, Resi[ℓ], V isitedPathk)
= true, which is the condition in line 24.
We explain that there is no node pℓ and a contradicting edge (pj , pℓ) with the
set Resi[ℓ]. By the assumption that V isitedPathk is correct and that node pℓ ∈
V isitedPathk, we have that pℓ ∈ C is correct. ThusResi[ℓ] = indices(Nℓ), see previ-
ous item of this claim on ComputeResults(). V isitedPathk is correct, and therefore
(pj , pℓ) must be in V isitedPathk.
• RemoveGarbage(), line 4. This procedure does not modify Resi =
RemoveContradictions(ComputeResults()). We have shown that Resulti[k] =
indices(Nk). Thus, only the correct neighborhood is confirmed for every correct node
pk.
Lemma 5 shows that eventually there are no fake nodes.
Lemma 5 (Eventually no fake nodes). Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 1
that starts in an arbitrary configuration, pj ∈ N be any node, and pℓ ∈ P \ (N)
be a node that is not included in the communication graph, G. Within O(|N |)
asynchronous rounds, the system reaches a configuration after which (pj , pℓ) 6∈
ConfirmedTopologyi
Proof. Let c ∈ R be the configuration reached within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds
according to Lemma 4. For any correct node, pi ∈ C, we show that in c, the execution
of RemoveContradictions() results in Counti[ℓ] ≤ f and nullifies Resulti[ℓ].
We start by showing that for every path p that relays a message which encodes
the set Resulti[ℓ], and does not contain Byzantine nodes, a contradiction is found in
RemoveContradictions(). Namely, the if conditions of line 24 holds.
Note that, p may not be a correct path even though it contains no Byzantine nodes.
For example p may contain nodes pz that are not even in the communication graph, i.e.,
pz ∈ P \ (N).
Let pr ∈ N be the first correct node on path p. Such a node exists, because pi is
correct and on the path p. Since pr is correct, after the execution ofComputeResults(),
we have that pr’s neighborhood,Nr, is encoded in Resulti[r], see Lemma 4.
Denote the last edge in the path (pr, ps), where ps ∈ P \ (N). Note that node ps
is not a node in the system and since Resulti[r] encodes Nr’s neighborhood, we have
that ps 6∈ Resulti[r]. Thus, the edge (pr, ps) is contradicting with the set Resulti[r].
Namely, by the condition in line 24, we have that line 25 must decrease Count[ℓ].
We note that immediately before the function RemoveContradictions() returns,
the integer Count[ℓ] may count only incorrect paths, which contain at least one Byzan-
tine node. Since there are at most f Byzantine nodes, Count[ℓ] ≤ f as needed.
Theorem 1 demonstrates the self-stabilization properties.
Theorem 1 (Self-stabilization). Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 1 that starts in
an arbitrary configuration and pi ∈ C be a correct node. Within O(|N |) asynchronous
rounds, the system reaches a safe configuration after which pi’s output is always legal,
see Definition 2.
Proof. The systems reaches configuration c ∈ R of Lemma 4 within O(|N |) asyn-
chronous rounds. We show that c is a safe configuration by showing that the out-
put is legal, we must show that ConfirmedTopologyi encodes a graph Goutput =
(Vout, Eout), such that: (1) C ⊆ Vout, (2) (E∩ (C×C)) ⊆ Eout, (3) Vout ⊆ C∪B ⊆
N , and (4) Eout ⊆ (E ∩ (C × C)) ∪ (B × (N)) ⊆ P ×N .
For every correct node pk ∈ C, we have that Nk is confirmed in c, see Lemma 4.
Thus, pk ∈ Vout and condition (1) holds.
Let (pj , pk) be an edge in the communication graph between two correct nodes, we
show (pj , pk) ∈ Eout. Since pj is correct, it is inserted to ConfirmedTopologyi, see
Lemma 4. Thus, (pj , pk) ∈ edges(Nj) ∧ edges(Nj) ⊆ ConfirmedTopologyi in c,
thus condition (2) holds as well.
There is no pℓ ∈ P \ (N) and node pj ∈ N , such that (pℓpj) ∈
ConfirmedTopologyi, see Lemma 5. Thus, Vout ⊆ C ∪ B ⊆ N and Eout ⊆
(E ∩ (C × C)) ∪ (B × (N)) ⊆ P ×N . I.e., conditions (3) and (4) hold in c.
B Implementation proposals for getDisjointPaths()
We consider the problem of relaying messages over the set CorrectPaths when
only ConfirmedTopology is known, and propose three implementations to the func-
tion getDisjointPaths(). The value of ConfirmedTopology is a set of directed
edges (pi, pj). An undirected edge is approved if both (pi, pj) and (pj , pi) appear in
ConfirmedTopology. Other edges inConfirmedTopology are said to be suspicious.
The arguments used here assume that the system is in a safe configuration with respect
to Algorithm 1. For each of the proposed implementations, we show that |Paths| is
polynomial and CorrectPaths ⊆ Paths. Thus, the sender and the receiver can ex-
change messages using a polynomial number of paths and message send operations,
because each path in Paths is of linear length.
The case of constant r and ∆. The sender and the receiver exchange messages
by using all possible paths between them. This is feasible only when considering r-
neighborhoods, rather than the entire connected component, where the neighborhood
radius, r, and the node degree ∆ are constants.
The case of constant f . This procedure entails sending a message on a path set,
Paths, where |Paths| is polynomial and CorrectPaths ⊆ Paths.
For each possible choice of f system nodes, p1, p2, . . . pf , the sender and
the receiver compute a new graph G(p1, p2, . . . pf ) that is the result of removing
p1, p2, . . . pf , from Gout, which is the graph defined by the discovered topology,
ConfirmedTopology. Let P(p1, p2, . . . pf ) be a set of f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths
in G(p1, p2, . . . pf ) (or the empty set when P(p1, p2, . . . pf ) does not exists) and
Paths =
⋃
p1,p2,...pf
P(p1, p2, . . . pf ). We show polynomial message cost by showing
that |Paths| is polynomial. We also show that for at least one choice of p1, p2, . . . pf ,
has a corresponding set P(p1, p2, . . . pf ) that contains CorrectPaths.
First we show that this procedure only sends messages through a polynomial num-
ber of paths. There are O(nf ) possible chooses of f system nodes. Thus, O(nf ) path
sets are computed, and since f is a constant, this number is polynomial. Moreover, each
such set contains at most f +1 simple paths of linear length, because pi only computes
sets, P(p1, p2, . . . pf ), of size f + 1. Thus, the sender and the receiver can exchange
messages using a polynomial number of paths and message send operations.
We show that CorrectPaths ⊆ Paths. Consider the permutation choice,
p1, p2, . . . pf , in which the set actually contains the set of Byzantine nodes in the system.
ThusG(p1, p2, . . . pf) contains only correct nodes. Furthermore, at least f+1 paths that
were present in Gout are still present in G(p1, p2, . . . pf ), since G(p1, p2, . . . pf) was
obtained from Gout by the removal of f (Byzantine) nodes, p1, p2, . . . pf . Hence, there
are at least f + 1 correct vertex-disjoint paths in G(p1, p2, . . . pf), in P(p1, p2, . . . pf )
and in Paths.
The case of no Byzantine neighbors The procedure assumes that any Byzan-
tine node has no directly connected Byzantine neighbor in the communication graph.
Specifically, this polynomial cost solution considers the (extended) graph,Gext, that in-
cludes all the edges in confirmedTopology and suspicious edges. Given three nodes,
pi, pj , pk ∈ P , we say that node pi considers the undirected edge (pk, pj) suspicious,
if the edge appears as a directed edge in ConfirmedTopologyi for only one direction,
e.g., (pj , pk).
The extended graph, Gext, may contain fake edges that do not exists in the com-
munication graph, but Byzantine nodes reports on their existence. Nevertheless, Gext
includes all the correct paths of the communication graph, G. Therefore, the 2f + 1
vertex-disjoint paths that exists in G also exists in Gext and they can facilitate a poly-
nomial cost solution for the message exchange task, as we next show.
Let G′ = (N,EG′) be the graph computed from ConfirmedTopology and its
suspicious edges. We demonstrate that G′’s edges, EG′ , contains the edges, EG, of the
communication graph, G. Let us consider e = (pj , pk) ∈ EG and show that e ∈ EG′ .
When both pj and pk are correct, the correctness of Algorithm 1 implies e ∈ EG′ .
Suppose that pj is correct and pk is Byzantine, and consider the different cases in which
pk decides to report (or not to report) about e as part of its local neighborhood. Namely,
either e ∈ ConfirmedTopology, or e is a suspicious edge, because pi reports about
e, and pk decides to report, and respectively, not to report. Since G ⊆ G′, G′ must
contain 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths between any sender ps and receiver pr, because
G does. Moreover, the same arguments implies that there may be at most f incorrect
paths, which contain each at least one Byzantine node. Hence, there are at least f + 1
correct vertex-disjoint paths in Paths.
C Correctness of Algorithm 2
Definitions 7, 8 and 9 are needed for Claim C, Claim C and Lemma 6.
Definition 7 (Confirmation). Given configuration c, we say that message m is con-
firmed (by the receiver) when m ∈ OutputMessageQueue.
Definition 8 (Approve). Given fair execution, R, of Algorithm 2, we say that message
m = 〈Source, Destination, V isitedPath, IntentedPath, ARQLabel, DATA,
Payload〉 is being approved (by the sender pSource) during the first atomic step,
asender , in which the sender executes line 18, where Source = sender ARQLabel =
m.ARQLabel and Payload = m.Payload, see line 17. Denote by capproved the con-
figuration that immediately follows asender. Given configuration c that appears after
capproved in R, we say that message m is approved (by the sender) in configuration c.
Definition 9 (Clear-sender-receiver). Given configuration c, we say that the sender
is clear (with respect to the receiver), if the queue Confirmations[receiver] = ∅
in c. Moreover, the receiver is clear (with respect to the sender) , if the queue
ReceivedMessages[sender] = ∅ in c.
Claim C shows that a message that is relayed on a correct path is received at the
destination within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds. Moreover, the destination receives the
message with correct visiting set.
Claim. Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 2 that starts in a safe configuration, c,
with respect to Algorithm 1. Let psource, pdest ∈ C be pair of correct nodes. Let csend
be the configuration immediately following a step in which psource sends messageMsg
on a correct path Path = psource, p1, p2, . . . pdest from source, psource, to destination,
pdest. Within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds, pdest receivesMsg with a visiting set con-
taining all nodes on Path except pdest.
Proof. Upon the arrival of message m to pk (line 5), node pi asserts that he is not
the destination, pdest, (line 6). Immediately after, pi sends the message m to the next
neighbor, pi+1, see line 8. Since the same argument holds when pj sends m to the next
node in path, we have that within |Path| asynchronous rounds, m is delivered to node
pdest.
Claim C says that when the sender repeatedly sends messageMsg, for a duration of
at least O(|N |) asynchronous rounds, the receiver eventually confirms message Msg.
Claim. Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 2 that starts in a safe configura-
tion, c, with respect to Algorithm 1. Let ps, pr ∈ C be a pair of correct send-
ing and receiving nodes. Suppose that, for a duration of at least O(capacity ·
|N |) asynchronous rounds, ps’s steps include only the execution of the function
ByzantineFaultT olerantSend(Msg) in the loop of line 4. Within that period, the
system reaches configuration creceive in which pr confirms Msg.
Proof. Denote csend as the configuration immediately following the first step in which
ps sends message Msg in R, see line 26. Within O(capacity · |N |) asynchronous
rounds, the first frame containing Msg arrives at pr, see Claim C. Moreover, after
another O(capacity · |N |) asynchronous rounds, every correct path relays message
Msg at least O(capacity · |N |) times. This is correct since every asynchronous round,
ps sends a new frame containing Msg on each of the 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths.
Moreover, by Claim C, the last frame sent on all 2f + 1 paths arrives after another
O(capacity · |N |).
Assume, in the way of proof by contradiction, thatMsg is not confirmed by pr. This
implies that the queues, ReceivedMessages[ps][∗], in pr containing messages sent
from ps were not cleared at least since csend, see line 22. Thus, pr contains capacity ·
n+1 indications ofMsg on f+1 vertex-disjoint paths. Denote clast as the configuration
immediately after the arrival of the (capacity · n+ 1)-th frame of the f + 1’th path to
relay capacity · n + 1 frames containing Msg. Immediately after clast, ps must go
through line 12, because the conditions in line 12 hold. Thus, a contradiction and Msg
is confirmed within O(capacity · |N |) asynchronous rounds.
Claim C says that when the receiver is sending acknowledgments about a message,
that message eventually becomes approved. We note that Claim C considers acknowl-
edgments sent from the receiver to the sender, rather than messages sent from the sender
to the receiver, as in Claim C.
Claim. Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 2 that starts in a safe configura-
tion, c, with respect to Algorithm 1. Let ps, pr ∈ C be a pair of correct send-
ing and receiving nodes. Suppose that, for a duration of at least O(capacity ·
|N |) asynchronous rounds, pr’s steps include only the execution of the function
ByzantineFaultT olerantSend(Ack) in the loop of line 23. That is, pr is sending
acknowledgments on message Msg. Within that period, the system reaches configura-
tion creceive in which ps approves Msg, see Definition 8.
Proof. Denote csend as the configuration immediately following the first step in which
pr sends acknowledgment Ack in R, see line 23. Within O(capacity · |N |) asyn-
chronous rounds, the first frame containing Ack arrives at ps, see Claim C. Moreover,
after anotherO(capacity ·|N |) asynchronous rounds, every correct path relays message
Ack at least O(capacity · |N |) times. This is correct since every asynchronous round,
pr sends a new frame containing Ack on each of the 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths.
Moreover, by Claim C, the last frame sent on all 2f + 1 paths arrives after another
O(capacity · |N |).
The queues, Confirmations[pr][∗] are cleared only when a message sent to pr is
approved, see line 2. Since, pr is acknowledging the current message, Msg, by sending
Ack, the only message that can be approved is Msg. This is true since each path, Path,
may contain at most capacity · |N | acknowledgments for other messages in the path
queues.
Assume, in the way of proof by contradiction, that Msg is not approved by ps.
By the arguments above, ps’s queues, Confirmationss[pr][∗], which contains pr’s
acknowledgments that ps received, were not cleared at least since csend, see line 2.
Thus, ps contains capacity · n + 1 indications of Ack on f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths.
Denote clast as the configuration immediately after the arrival of the (capacity·n+1)-th
frame of the f+1’th path to relay capacity ·n+1 frames containingAck. Immediately
after clast, ps must go through line 18, because the conditions in line 18 hold. Thus, a
contradiction and Msg is approved within O(capacity · |N |) asynchronous rounds.
Lemma 6 shows that the senders repeatedly fetch messages.
Lemma 6. Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 2 that starts in a safe configuration,
c, with respect to Algorithm 1. Let ps, pr ∈ C be pair of correct sending and receiving
nodes. Moreover, cℓ is the configuration that immediately follows the ℓ-th time in R in
which ps fetches a message from the input queue. For every ℓ, the system reaches cℓ
within O(ℓ · |N |) asynchronous rounds.
Proof. By the code of Algorithm 2, on every iteration of the do forever loop (lines 2
to 4), a message is fetched in line 3. This do forever loop includes another loop in
line 4. We prove the lemma by showing that the loop of line 4 is completed within
O(|N |) asynchronous rounds.
The proof considers the case in which the sender, ps, does not wait in line 4 for a
long time before considering the case in which ps does wait. We show that for the latter
case, the receiver, pr, confirms ps’s current message. After confirming the message, the
receiver, pr, begins sending acknowledgments to the sender, ps. The proof shows that
after the acknowledgments are sent, ps approves the message and fetches a new one.
We show this by considering the case in which pr repeatedly sends acknowledgments
for a sufficient amount of time, and a case in which it does not.
Suppose that ps does not wait in line 4 more than O(capacity · |N |) asynchronous
rounds. In this case, ps starts the infinite loop again within O(capacity · |N |) asyn-
chronous rounds, and fetch a new message, see line 3. Thus, for the case in which ps
does not wait in line 4 more than O(capacity · |N |) asynchronous rounds, the lemma
is correct.
Suppose that ps is executing line 4 and waits for acknowledgments on messageMsg
for more than O(capacity · |N |) asynchronous rounds. Thus, ps floods 2f + 1 vertex-
disjoint paths with the messageMsg, see Figure 2. Eventually, the receiver, pr, receives
message Msg for O(capacity · |N |) times on f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths and confirms
Msg, see Claim C. After confirming it, the receiver sends acknowledgments on 2f +1
vertex-disjoint paths until confirming a new message Msgnew. This is true because the
condition in line 23 holds only when a new message is confirmed, see line 13.
Let us consider the case in which, during O(capacity · |N |) asynchronous rounds,
message Msgnew does not arrive to the receiver. By Claim C, eventually the sender
receives the acknowledgments for capacity ·n+1 times on f +1 vertex-disjoint paths.
Claim C also says that the sender considers the message accepted by the receiver. In
line 18, the sender assigns Approved = true. Thus, the condition in line 4 holds and
the sender fetches the next message, see line 3. Hence, the system reaches configuration
cfetch that immediately follows a step in which the sender, ps, fetches the next message.
Thus, for the case in which, during O(capacity · |N |) asynchronous rounds, message
Msgnew does not arrive to the receiver, the lemma is correct.
We continue by considering the case in which, during O(capacity · |N |) asyn-
chronous rounds, message Msgnew does arrive to the receiver. Let cconf be the config-
uration that immediately follows the step in which pr confirmsMsg. Since the receiver
confirms Msg, we have that pr is clear (with respect to the sender) in configuration
cconf , see Definition 9 and line 22.
If Msgnew was sent by the sender, it must have been fetched after c, and cfetch is
reached when message Msgnew is fetched. It may be the case however, that Msgnew
was not sent by the sender. Message Msgnew was confirmed by 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint
paths. Since there are at most f Byzantine nodes, at least one of these paths, Path, must
be correct. Moreover, in cconf , the receiver is clear, thus the capacity · n + 1 that pr
counts in ReceivedMessages[ps][∗] have all been received after configuration cconf .
Note that the sender sends at least one of these messages, because at most capacity · n
messages could be in the edges of Path at any given configuration. Thus the sender
sends Msgnew, which ps fetches immediately before cfetch. I.e., the system reaches
cfetch.
Theorem 1 says that, starting from the fourth (or even the third) message that the
sender fetches, the receiver confirms the sender’s messages. The proof of Theorem 1 is
based on Lemma 7, which says that, in every sequence of four messages that the sender
is fetching, the receiver confirms the fourth (or even the third) message.
Lemma 7. Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 2 that starts in a safe configuration,
cstart, with respect to Algorithm 1. Let ch be a configuration that immediately follows
the h-th step in which the sender fetches the h-th input queue message, mh. Within
O(|N |) asynchronous rounds, the receiver confirms message m4.
Proof. Claim. In c2, the sender is clear (with respect to the receiver), see Definition 9.
Proof. By definition, c2 immediately follows atomic step a2, in which, after clearing
the confirmation queue in line 2, the sender fetches message m2 and sends it. 
Claim. Between the configurations c3 and c4, there is a configuration creceiver−clear in
which the receiver is clear (with respect to the sender).
Proof. Suppose, without the loss of generality, that immediately after csender−clear,
the sender is waiting for a message with label 1. By lemma 6, the sender even-
tually fetches the next message. The sender can only fetch a new message once
Approved is true, see line 4. Moreover, Approved is only set to true once the queue
Confirmations[receiver][∗] contains 2f + 1 flooded paths, see line 18. Thus, the
sender counts 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths that relayed acknowledgments with label
1. Moreover, the sender is clear in csender−clear . Hence, configuration csender−clear
contains no message in Confirmations[receiver][∗]. Starting from csender−clear , the
sender receives capacity · n+ 1 acknowledgments on 2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths for
the current message with label 1. Note that at least one of these 2f + 1 paths, Path, is
correct, because there are f Byzantine. Since |Path| ≤ n and each edge on Path may
contain at most capacity messages, we have that at least one of the acknowledgments
that includes Path as its visiting path, is sent by the receiver between csender−clear and
configuration creceiver−send ∈ R. We show that creceiver−send = creceiver−clear .
This means that after csender−clear , the sender clears the confirmations queue,
Confirmations[receiver][∗], and fetches the next message, assigning it the label 2,
see lines 2 through line 4. By similar arguments, we know that the receiver sends at
least one acknowledgment with label 2.
To conclude, there is a configuration c ∈ R in which the receiver is sending ac-
knowledgments with label 1, and then a configuration c′ in which the receiver sends
acknowledgments with label 2. Moreover, between two consecutive executions of
line 23, the receiver has to go through line 22. Thus, the receiver cleared it’s message
queues,Confirmations[sender][∗], immediately before configuration creceiver−clear
and creceiver−send = creceiver−clear . 
Let us consider configuration creceiver−clear from the end of proof of Claim C.
The next message to be sent after creceiver−clear , is m4, the message fetched in
c4, with label 0. Between creceiver−clear and c4, all messages sent by the sender have
the label 2. By arguments stated above, the message, m, that is the next message to
be confirmed after creceiver−clear , must have been sent by the sender at least once
since creceiver−clear . The sender, sends only messages with label 0 and 2. More-
over, the last message to be confirmed had a label 2. Thus, CurrentLabel = 2, see
line 21. Any sent message with label 2 is not inserted to the confirmations queue,
Confirmations[sender][∗] between creceiver−clear and the configuration that imme-
diately follows the next sender’s fetch, see line 20. Thus, by line 3, the next message to
be confirmed is a message with label 0, which must be m4.
Theorem 1 (Self-stabilization) Let R be a fair execution of Algorithm 2 that starts in
an arbitrary configuration. Within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds, the system reaches a
safe configuration c after which: (1) for every step ams where the sender sends m there
is a corresponding step amr ∈ R where the receiver confirms message m, and (2) for
every step amr , there is a corresponding step, ams ∈ R, that occurs before amr and in
which the sender sends m.
Proof. Let c be the configuration that Claim C denote as c4, which the system reaches
within O(|N |) asynchronous rounds, see Lemma 6. Letmi be the i-th message fetched.
Suppose that i ≥ 4. Lemma 7 considers the four consecutive messagesmi−3, . . .mi
and says that the receiver confirms message mi. Thus, condition (1) holds.
Condition (2) follows from arguments similar to the ones used in the
proof of Claim C. Namely, for the case of i ≥ 5, message mi−1 is con-
firmed, see lemma 7. Immediately after the receiver confirms mi−1, it clears
the queue ReceivedMessages[sender][∗], see lines 20 to 22. Thus, there ex-
ists a configuration creceiver−clear in which the receiver is clear (with respect
to the sender) before ci, see Definition 9. Moreover, a message is confirmed
only if the queue ReceivedMessages[sender][∗] contains 2f + 1 flooded paths,
see line 12. These flooded paths implies that in configuration ci, the queue
ReceivedMessages[sender][∗] contains capacity · n + 1 indications of mi on
2f + 1 node disjoint paths. Thus, mi is confirmed only after a period that follows
creceiver−clear and includes its reception at least capacity · n+ 1 times on each of the
2f + 1 vertex-disjoint paths.
Recall that we assume that there are at most f Byzantine nodes in the system. At
least one path, Path, of the above 2f + 1 paths is correct. Moreover, |Path| ≤ n and
each edge on Path may contain at most capacity messages. Thus, at least one of the
capacity · n + 1 message that were relayed on the correct path Path was sent by the
sender. This completes the correctness proof.
